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Quantum Replicator Dynamics
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We propose quantization relationships which would let us describe and solution problems origi-
nated by conflicting or cooperative behaviors among the members of a system from the point of view
of quantum mechanical interactions. The quantum analogue of the replicator dynamics is the equa-
tion of evolution of mixed states from quantum statistical mechanics. A system and all its members
will cooperate and rearrange its states to improve their present condition. They strive to reach the
best possible state for each of them which is also the best possible state for the whole system. This
led us to propose a quantum equilibrium in which a system is stable only if it maximizes the welfare
of the collective above the welfare of the individual. If it is maximized the welfare of the individual
above the welfare of the collective the system gets unstable and eventually it collapses.
PACS numbers: 03.65.-w, 02.50.Le, 03.67.-a, 03.67.Lx
I. INTRODUCTION
Why quantum versions have shown be more efficient
and provide more advantages than their classical ver-
sions? Maybe quantum mechanics is a more general
theory that we had thought and it would let us explain
more correctly not only economical but also biological
phenomena which have been described before through
game theory. If there is an actual connection between
game theory and quantum mechanics, we could estab-
lish quantization relationships between our classical into
quantum systems for any cases. We could also propose
a more general quantum equilibrium applicable to any
classical system but which remains inside its foundations
the classical definitions of equilibrium. The purpose of
this paper is show the relationships between the replica-
tor dynamics and quantum mechanics. We will propose
the quantization relationships for a classical system and a
new quantum equilibrium concept from which is possible
to obtain and understand the classical equilibria.
Game theory [1–3] is the study of decision making of
competing agents in some conflict situation. It tries to
understand the birth and the development of conflicting
or cooperative behaviors among a group of individuals
who behave rationally and strategically according to their
personal interests. Each member in the group strive to
maximize its welfare, state, utilities or payoffs by choos-
ing the best courses of strategies from a cooperative or
individual point of view. Game theory has been applied
to solve many problems in economics, social sciences, bi-
ology and engineering.
Evolutionary game theory [4–6] does not rely on ra-
tional assumptions but on the idea that the Darwinian
process of natural selection [7] drives organisms towards
the optimization of reproductive success [8]. It combines
the principles of game theory, evolution and dynamical
systems to explain the distribution of different pheno-
types in biological populations. Instead of working out
the optimal strategy, the different phenotypes in a pop-
ulation are associated with the basic strategies that are
shaped by trial and error by a process of natural selec-
tion or learning. It can also be used to interpret classical
games from a different perspective. Instead of directly
calculating properties of a game, populations of players
using different strategies are simulated and a process sim-
ilar to natural selection is used to determine how the
population evolves. This is made through the stability
analysis of differential equations and the implications to
the games [9]. The central equilibrium concept of evolu-
tionary game theory is the notion of Evolutionary Stable
Strategy introduced by J. Smith and G. Price [4, 10].
An ESS is described as a strategy which has the prop-
erty that if all the members of a population adopt it, no
mutant strategy could invade the population under the
influence of natural selection. ESS are interpreted as sta-
ble results of processes of natural selection. The natural
selection process that determines how populations play-
ing specific strategies evolve is known as the replicator
dynamics [5, 6, 9, 11] whose stable fixed points are Nash
equilibria [2].
Quantum games have proposed a new point of view
for the solution of the classical problems and dilemmas
in game theory. It has been shown that quantum games
are more efficient than classical games and provide a satu-
rated upper bound for this efficiency [12–22]. Meyer [12]
quantized a coin tossing game and found out that one
player could increase his expected payoff and win with
certainty by implementing a quantum strategy against
his opponent’s classical strategy. Eisert et al [13] de-
veloped a general protocol for two player–two strategy
quantum games with entanglement by quantizing pris-
oner’s dilemma. They found a unique Nash Equilibrium,
which is different from the classical one, and the dilemma
could be solved if the two players are allowed to use
quantum strategies. This also was extended to multi-
player games [23]. Marinatto and Weber [15] extended
the concept of a classical two-person static game to the
2quantum domain by giving an Hilbert structure to the
space of classical strategies. They showed that the in-
troduction of entangled strategies in battle of the sexes
game leads to a unique solution of this game. Du et al
[17] implemented a game via nuclear magnetic resonance
(NMR) system. It was demonstrated that neither of the
two players would win the game if they play rationally,
but if they adopt quantum strategies both of them would
win. Quantum games has been used to explore unsolved
problems of quantum information [24] and in the produc-
tion of algorithms for quantum computers [25]. Quantum
communication can be considered as a game where the
objective is maximize effective communication. Also dis-
tributed computing, cryptography, watermarking and in-
formation hiding tasks can be modeled as games [26–32].
Piotrowski and Sladkowski have modeled markets, auc-
tions and bargaining assuming traders can use quantum
protocols [33, 34]. In the new quantum market games,
transactions are described in terms of projective opera-
tions acting on Hilbert spaces of strategies of traders. A
quantum strategy represents a superposition of trading
actions and can achieve outcomes not realizable by clas-
sical means [35]. Furthermore, quantum mechanics has
features that can be used to model aspects of market be-
havior. For example, traders observe the actions of other
players and adjust their actions [34] and the maximal
capital flow at a given price corresponds to entanglement
between buyers and sellers [33]. Nature may be playing
quantum survival games at the molecular level [36, 37].
It could lead us to describe many of the life processes
through quantum mechanics like Gogonea and Merz [38]
on protein molecules. Game theory and quantum game
theory offer interesting and powerful tools and their re-
sults will probably find their applications in computation,
complex system analysis and cognition sciences [39–41].
II. REPLICATOR DYNAMICS & EGT
Payoffs in biological games are in terms of fitness a
measure of reproductive success [8]. Strategies are con-
sidered to be inherited programs for any conceivable situ-
ation which control the individual’s behavior. The mem-
bers of a population interact in game situations and the
joint action of mutation and selection replaces strategies
by others with a higher reproductive success. It is less
important to know which member plays which strategy
within a population but it is important to know the rel-
ative frequency of actions, it means the probability of
playing any strategy.
A symmetric two - person game G = (S,E) consists of
a finite nonempty pure strategy set S and a payoff func-
tion E which assigns a real number to the pair (si, sj).
E(si, sj) is the payoff obtained by a player who plays the
strategy si against an opponent who plays the strategy
sj . A mixed strategy x is a probability distribution over
S.
A best reply to q is a strategy p which maximizes
E(p, q). An equilibrium point is a pair (p, q) with the
property that p and q are best replies to each other. A
strategy r is a strict best reply to a strategy q if it is the
only best reply to q. A strict best reply must be a pure
strategy. An equilibrium point (p, q) is called strict if p
and q are strict best replies to each other. A best reply to
p which is different from p is called alternative best reply
to p.
A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a set of strategies, one for
each player, such that no player has an incentive to uni-
laterally change his action. Players are in equilibrium
if a change in strategies by any one of them would lead
that player to earn less than if he remained with his cur-
rent strategy. A Nash equilibrium satisfies the following
condition
E(p, p) ≥ E(r, p). (1)
A player can not increase his payoff if he decides to play
the strategy r instead of p.
Each agent in a n-player game where the ith player has
as strategy space Si is modeled by a population of players
which have to be partitioned into groups. Individuals in
the same group would all play the same strategy. Ran-
domly we make play the members of the subpopulations
against each other. The subpopulations that perform
the best will grow and those that do not will shrink and
eventually will vanish. The process of natural selection
assures survival of the best players at the expense of the
others. A population equilibrium occurs when the pop-
ulation shares are such that the expected payoffs for all
strategies are equal.
Consider a large population in which a two person
game G = (S,E) is played by randomly matched pairs of
animals generation after generation. Let p be the strat-
egy played by the vast majority of the population, and let
r be the strategy of a mutant present in small frequency.
Both p and r can be pure or mixed. An evolutionary
stable strategy (ESS) p of a symmetric two - person game
G = (S,E) is a pure or mixed strategy for G which sat-
isfies the following two conditions
E(p, p) > E(r, p),
If E(p, p) = E(r, p) then E(p, r) > E(r, r). (2)
Since the stability condition only concerns to alternative
best replies, p is always evolutionarily stable if (p, p) is
an strict equilibrium point. An ESS is also a Nash equi-
librium since it is the best reply to itself and the game
is symmetric. The set of all the strategies that are ESS
is a subset of the NE of the game. A population which
plays an ESS can withstand an invasion by a small group
of mutants playing a different strategy. It means that if
a few individuals which play a different strategy are in-
troduced into a population in an ESS, the evolutionarily
selection process would eventually eliminate the invaders.
3The natural selection process that determines how
populations playing specific strategies evolve is known
as the replicator dynamics. It describes the evolution of
a polymorphic state in a population represented by a
mixed strategy x for G whose members are involved in
a conflict described by a symmetric two - person game
G = (S,E). The probability assigned to a pure strat-
egy s is denoted by x(s). If si, i = 1, ..., n ∈ S are the
pure strategies available to a player, then that player’s
strategy will be denoted by the column vector x where
xi ∈ [0, 1] and
∑n
i=1 xi = 1 in which the i
th component
of x gives the probability of playing strategy si. The
ith component of x also is interpreted as the relative fre-
quency of individuals using strategy si. Playing a pure
strategy sj is represented by the vector x whose j
th com-
ponent is 1, and all the other components are 0. The
fitness function is given by E = fi(x), i = 1, ..., n and
specifies how successful each subpopulation is. The fit-
ness function must be defined for each component of x.
The fitness for xi is the expected utility of playing strat-
egy si against a player with a mixed strategy defined by
the vector x and is given by
fi(x) = (Ax)i, (3)
where A is the payoff matrix and the subscript i = 1, ..., n
denotes the ith component of the matrix-vector product.
Or also
fi(x) =
n∑
j=1
aijxj , (4)
where aij are the elements of the payoff matrix A. The
average fitness of the population is given by
〈f(x)〉 = xTAx, (5)
〈f(x)〉 =
n∑
i=1
xifi(x), (6)
〈f(x)〉 =
n∑
k,l=1
aklxkxl. (7)
The superscript T denotes transpose.
The evolution of relative frequencies in a population is
described by the replicator dynamics
dxi(t)
dt
= [fi(x)− 〈f(x)〉]xi(t). (8)
By replacing relations (3) and (5) in equation (8) and by
replacing relations (4) and (7) we can obtain two different
ways of representing the replicator dynamics
dxi(t)
dt
=
[
(Ax)i − x
TAx
]
xi(t), (9)
dxi(t)
dt
=


n∑
j=1
aijxj −
n∑
k,l=1
aklxkxl

 xi(t). (10)
The stable fixed points of the replicator dynamics are
Nash equilibria. It is important to note that the fixed
points of a system do not change in the time. It means
that if a population reaches a state which is a Nash equi-
librium, it will remain there. There are different versions
of these equations [5, 6, 9, 11] depending on the evo-
lutionary model used. The replicator dynamics rewards
strategies that outperform the average by increasing their
frequency, and penalizes poorly performing strategies by
decreasing their frequency.
In a symmetric game payoff matrices and actions are
identical for both agents. These games can be modeled
by a single population of individuals playing against each
other. When the game being played is asymmetric, a dif-
ferent population of players must be used to simulate
each agent. For a two-player asymmetric normal game
each player will have a distinct payoff matrix A and B.
The strategy vector for player one is represented by x and
for player two is represented by y. Player one has n
strategies s1i, i = 1, ..., n ∈ S1 and player two has m
strategies s2j , j = 1, ...,m ∈ S2. The fitness for a player
who plays the strategy s1i will be f1i = (Ay)i and the av-
erage fitness of the first population will be 〈f1〉 = x
TAy.
The fitness for a player who plays the strategy s2i will be
f2i = (Bx)i and the average fitness of the second popu-
lation will be 〈f2〉 = y
TBx. The evolution of this game
would be described for the next equations system
dxi(t)
dt
=
[
(Ay)1 − x
TAy
]
xi(t),
dyi(t)
dt
=
[
(Bx)1 − y
TBx
]
yi(t). (11)
The genetic code is the relationship between the sequence
of the bases in the DNA and the sequence of amino acids
in proteins. Recent work [42] about evolvability of the
genetic code suggests that the code is shaped by natural
selection.
III. REPLICATOR DYNAMICS MATRIX FORM
As we saw the replicator dynamics is a differential
equation where x is a column vector. Obviously, the
matrix U = (Ax)i − x
TAx has to be diagonal and its
elements are given by
uii =
n∑
j=1
aijxj −
n∑
k,l=1
aklxkxl. (12)
The replicator dynamics can be expressed as
dx
dt
= Ux. (13)
By multiplying each element of the vector x by its corre-
sponding (xi)
−1/2 in both parts of equation (10) or (13),
we can get
v = Uxˆ, (14)
4where v and xˆ are column vectors with elements vi =
1
(xi)1/2
dxi
dt and xˆi = (xi)
1/2 respectively. Lets multiply
equation (14) by xˆT and lets define the matrix
G =
1
2
vxˆT , (15)
where gij =
1
2
(xj)
1/2
(xi)1/2
dxi
dt are the elements of G. The ma-
trix G is also equal to
G =
1
2
UxˆxˆT (16)
with
(UxˆxˆT )ij =
(∑n
k=1 aikxk −
∑n
k,l=1 aklxkxl
)
(xixj)
1/2.
Lets find GT
GT =
1
2
(vxˆT )T ,
GT =
1
2
xˆvT , (17)
where gTij =
1
2
(xi)
1/2
(xj)1/2
dxj
dt are the elements of G
T . The
matrix GT is also equal to
GT =
1
2
(UxˆxˆT )T ,
GT =
1
2
xˆxˆTUT (18)
with
(xˆxˆTUT )ij = (xjxi)
1/2
(∑n
k=1 ajkxk −
∑n
k,l=1 aklxkxl
)
.
Lets define
dX
dt
= G+GT (19)
so that the matrix X has as elements
xij = (xixj)
1/2
. (20)
The time evolution of X is also equal to
G+GT =
1
2
(UxˆxˆT + xˆxˆTUT ) (21)
with
(
G+GT
)
ij
=
1
2
n∑
k=1
aikxk(xixj)
1/2
+
1
2
n∑
k=1
ajkxk(xjxi)
1/2
−
n∑
k,l=1
aklxkxl(xixj)
1/2. (22)
Lets call
(G1)ij =
1
2
n∑
k=1
aikxk(xixj)
1/2, (23)
(G2)ij =
1
2
n∑
k=1
ajkxk(xjxi)
1/2, (24)
(G3)ij =
n∑
k,l=1
aklxkxl(xixj)
1/2 (25)
the elements of the matrixesG1, G2 andG3 that compose
by adding the matrix
(
G+GT
)
. We can factorize G1 in
two matrixes Q and X . It means
G1 = QX , (26)
where Q is a diagonal matrix and has as elements qii =
1
2
∑n
k=1 aikxk. In the same way
G2 = XQ. (27)
The matrix G3 can also be represented as (G3)ij =∑n
l=1(xixl)
1/2
∑n
k=1 aklxk(xlxj)
1/2 and it can be factor-
ized into
G3 = 2XQX . (28)
It is easy to show that X2 = X so that we can write the
equation (19) like
dX
dt
= QXX +XXQ− 2XQX (29)
and finally, by grouping into commutators
dX
dt
= [[Q,X ] , X ] , (30)
dX(t)
dt
= [Λ(t), X(t)] , (31)
where Λ = [Q,X ].
The elements of Λ are given by (Λ)ij =
1
2
[
(
∑n
k=1 aikxk) (xixj)
1/2 − (xjxi)
1/2 (
∑n
k=1 ajkxk)
]
.
Equations (30) and (31) can be considered as a gen-
eralization of the replicator dynamics as was seen in
equations (8), (9) and (10). We could call X the relative
frequency matrix and its evolution is described by
equation (31). Matrix X has the following properties
a) Tr(X) = 1,
b) X2 = X ,
c) XT = X .
It is easy to realize that each component of this matrix
will evolve following the replicator dynamics as was seen
5in equations (8), (9) and (10) so that we could call equa-
tion (31) the matrix form of the replicator dynamics. If
we take Θ = [Λ, X ] equation (31) becomes into
dX
dt
= Θ, (32)
where the elements of Θ are given by
(Θ)ij =
1
2
n∑
k=1
aikxk(xixj)
1/2
+
1
2
n∑
k=1
ajkxk(xjxi)
1/2
−
n∑
k,l=1
alkxkxl(xixj)
1/2. (33)
The fact that we can calculate the evolution of interfer-
ence effects between relative frequencies like (xixj)
1/2 is
the advantage of using equation (31) besides equation
(10).
IV. MIXED AND PURE STATES IN QUANTUM
MECHANICS
In classical mechanics we can precisely specify the state
of a system by one point in its phase space. Its trajectory
through the phase space describes the time evolution of
the system and this evolution follows Newton’s laws or
Hamilton equations. In quantum mechanics we can pre-
cisely describe the state of a system by specifying its
state vector |Ψ(t)〉 or its wave function Ψ(r, t) and the
evolution of the system is given by Schro¨dinger equation.
However, in most cases when the information about the
system is incomplete the state of a system is not per-
fectly defined for which we have to describe our system
in terms of probabilities [43, 44].
An ensemble is a collection of identically prepared
physical systems. When each member of the ensemble is
characterized by the same state vector |Ψ(t)〉 it is called
pure ensemble. If each member has a probability pi of
being in the state |Ψi(t)〉 we have a mixed ensemble. The
state of a system |Ψi(t)〉 =
∣∣∣Ψ(i)k (t)
〉
is a column vector∣∣∣Ψ(i)k (t)
〉
= (Ψ
(i)
1 (t),Ψ
(i)
2 (t), ...,Ψ
(i)
n (t))T , k = 1, ..., n.
For the case of pure ensemble the expected value of
measure certain observable described by the operator A
in the state |Ψ(t)〉 at the instant t is given by
〈A〉 = 〈Ψ(t)|A |Ψ(t)〉 =
n∑
i,j=1
〈j |Ψ(t) 〉 aij 〈Ψ(t) |i〉 ,
〈A〉 =
n∑
i,j=1
aijc
∗
i (t)cj(t), (34)
where aij are the elements of the matrix that represents
the observable A. The terms c∗i (t) = 〈Ψ(t) |i〉 and cj(t) =
〈j |Ψ(t) 〉 are the elements of certain operator ρ(t)
c∗i (t)cj(t) = 〈j |Ψ(t) 〉 〈Ψ(t) |i〉 = 〈j| ρ(t) |i〉 (35)
defined as
ρ(t) = |Ψ(t)〉 〈Ψ(t)| . (36)
The density operator ρ(t) for a pure ensemble in a state
|Ψ(t)〉 satisfies the following properties
a) ρ+(t) = ρ(t),
b) ρ2(t) = ρ(t),
c) Trρ2(t) = 1.
The superscript + denotes Hermitian. We can make all
the predictions made for |Ψ(t)〉 in function of ρ(t). The
sum of the diagonal elements of the density matrix is one
∑
n
|cn(t)|
2
= Trρ(t) = 1. (37)
The mean value of an observable A is calculated using
〈A〉 = Tr {ρ(t)A} . (38)
The time evolution of the density operator is given by
the following equation
i~
dρ(t)
dt
= [H(t), ρ(t)] . (39)
Each member of a mixed ensemble is a pure state and
its evolution is given by Schro¨dinger equation. The prob-
abilities for each state are constrained to satisfy the nor-
malization condition
n∑
i=1
pi = 1, (40)
where 0 ≤ p1,p2, ..., pn ≤ 1. Suppose we make a measure-
ment on a mixed ensemble of some observable A. The
ensemble average of A is defined by the average of the ex-
pected values measured in each member of the ensemble
described by |Ψi(t)〉 and with probability pi
〈A〉ρ =
n∑
i=1
pi 〈Ψi(t)|A |Ψi(t)〉 (41)
it means 〈A〉ρ = p1 〈A〉1 + p2 〈A〉2 + ...+ pn 〈A〉n .
〈A〉ρ =
n∑
i=1
pi 〈Ψi(t)|A |Ψi(t)〉 ,
〈A〉ρ =
n∑
i,j,k=1
pi 〈Ψi(t) |j 〉 〈j|A |k〉 〈k |Ψi(t) 〉 ,
〈A〉ρ =
n∑
i,j,k=1
piajkc
(i)∗
j (t)c
(i)
k (t), (42)
6where ajk are the elements of the matrix that represents
the observable A. The terms c
(i)
k (t) = 〈k |Ψi(t) 〉 and
c
(i)∗
j (t) = 〈Ψi(t) |j 〉 are the elements of certain operator
ρ(t)
n∑
i=1
pic
(i)∗
j (t)c
(i)
k (t) =
n∑
i=1
〈k |Ψi(t) 〉 pi 〈Ψi(t) |j 〉 ,
n∑
i=1
pic
(i)∗
j (t)c
(i)
k (t) = 〈k| ρ(t) |j〉 (43)
now defined as
ρ(t) =
n∑
i=1
pi |Ψi(t)〉 〈Ψi(t)| . (44)
The density operator contains all the physically signifi-
cant information we can possibly obtain about the en-
semble in question. Any two ensembles that produce the
same density operator are physically indistinguishable.
From equation (42) we have
〈A〉 = Tr {ρ(t)A} . (45)
The density operator for a mixed ensemble satisfies the
next properties
a) ρ is Hermitian,
b) Trρ(t) = 1,
c) ρ2(t) 6 ρ(t),
d) Trρ2(t) 6 1.
A pure state is specified by pi = 1 for some |Ψi(t)〉 , i =
1, ..., n and the density operator ρ(t) is represented by a
matrix with all its elements equal to zero except one 1
on the diagonal.
The diagonal elements ρnn of the density operator ρ(t)
represents the average probability of finding the system
in the state |n〉
ρnn = 〈n| ρ(t) |n〉 =
n∑
i=1
〈n |Ψi(t) 〉 pi 〈Ψi(t) |n 〉 ,
ρnn =
n∑
i=1
pi
∣∣∣c(i)n
∣∣∣
2
, (46)
where c
(i)
n = 〈n |Ψi(t) 〉 and
∣∣∣c(i)n
∣∣∣
2
∈ R+. If the state of
the system is |Ψi(t)〉,
∣∣∣c(i)n
∣∣∣
2
is the probability of finding,
in a measurement, this system in the state |n〉. The di-
agonal elements ρnn are zero if and only if all
∣∣∣c(i)n
∣∣∣
2
are
zero. The non-diagonal elements ρnp expresses the inter-
ference effects between the states |n〉 and |p〉 which can
appear when the state |Ψi〉 is a coherent linear superpo-
sition of these states
ρnp = 〈n| ρ(t) |p〉 =
n∑
i=1
〈n |Ψi(t) 〉 pi 〈Ψi(t) |p 〉 ,
ρnp =
n∑
i=1
pi c
(i)
n (t)c
(i)∗
p (t) (47)
with c
(i)
n (t) = 〈n |Ψi(t) 〉, c
(i)∗
p (t) = 〈Ψi(t) |p 〉 and
c
(i)
n c
(i)∗
p ∈ C. If ρnp = 0, it means that the average has
canceled out any interference effects between |n〉 and |p〉
but if it is different from zero subsists certain coherence
between these states.
The time evolution of the density operator that de-
scribes a mixed or pure ensemble is given by
i~
dρ(t)
dt
= [H(t), ρ(t)] (48)
which is the quantum analogue of Liouville’s theo-
rem from classical mechanics and a generalization of
Schro¨dinger equation.
V. DENSITY OPERATOR & QUANTUM
STATISTICAL MECHANICS
Now lets review briefly the connection between the
density operator and quantum statistical mechanics [44].
The basic assumption we make to obtain density opera-
tor from the study of an ensemble in thermal equilibrium
is that nature tends to maximize σ subject to the con-
straint that the ensemble average of the Hamiltonian has
a certain prescribed value. The quantity σ is defined by
σ = −Tr(ρ ln ρ) (49)
which can be regarded as a quantitative measure of dis-
order.
It is easy to show that for a completely random en-
semble in where the density matrix diagonalized looks
like
ρ =
1
N


1 0
1
1
...
1
1
0 1


(50)
the quantity σ takes the value
σ = lnN (51)
7and in contrast, for a pure ensemble with a density matrix
diagonalized similar to
ρ =


0 0
0
1
0
...
0
0 0


(52)
the quantity σ takes the value
σ = 0. (53)
A pure ensemble is an ensemble with a maximum amount
of order because all members are characterized by the
same quantum mechanical state ket. By the other hand,
a completely random ensemble in which all quantum me-
chanical states are equally likely σ takes its maximum
possible value subject to the normalization condition
∑
k
ρkk = 1. (54)
Our quantity σ is related to the definition of entropy S
from quantum statistical mechanics via
S = kσ, (55)
where k is the Boltzmann constant. Once that σ is a
maximum and thermal equilibrium is established, we ex-
pect
dρ
dt
= 0. (56)
We maximize σ by requiring that
δσ = 0 (57)
subject to the constrains
δ 〈H〉 =
∑
k
δρkkEk = 0 (58)
and
δ(Tr(ρ)) =
∑
k
δρkk = 0. (59)
By the use of Lagrange multipliers we can accomplish
these and we can obtain
∑
k
δρkk [(ln ρkk + 1) + βEk + γ] = 0 (60)
which for an arbitrary variation is possibly only if
ρkk = exp(−βEk − γ − 1), (61)
where we can eliminate γ using the normalization condi-
tion and our final result is
ρkk =
exp(−βEk)∑
l
exp(−βEl)
. (62)
The denominator of equation (62) is the partition func-
tion
Z =
∑
l
exp(−βEl) = Tr(e
−βH). (63)
Given ρkk in the energy basis we can write the density
operator as
ρ =
e−βH
Z
. (64)
The operator ρ is the quantum mechanical analogue of
the equilibrium density of points in the phase space for
an canonical ensemble.
The diagonal elements of the density operator in the
{|n〉} basis of eigenvectors of H are given by
ρnn =
〈n| e−βH |n〉
Z
=
e−βEn
Z
(65)
and the non diagonal elements are equal to
ρnp =
〈n| e−βH |p〉
Z
=
e−βEp
Z
〈n |p 〉 = 0. (66)
At thermodynamic equilibrium, the populations of the
stationary states are exponentially decreasing functions
of the energy, and the coherences between stationary
states are zero [43].
VI. QUANTIZATION RELATIONSHIPS &
QUANTUM REPLICATOR DYNAMICS
Let us propose the next quantization relationships
xi →
n∑
k=1
〈i |Ψk 〉 pk 〈Ψk |i 〉 = ρii, (67)
(xixj)
1/2 →
n∑
k=1
〈i |Ψk 〉 pk 〈Ψk |j 〉 = ρij . (68)
It means that a population will be represented by a quan-
tum system in which each subpopulation playing strategy
si will be represented by a pure ensemble in the state
|Ψk(t)〉 and with probability pk. The probability xi of
playing strategy si or the relative frequency of the indi-
viduals using strategy si in that population will be repre-
sented as the probability ρii of finding each pure ensemble
in the state |i〉. Our matrix X of relative frequencies of
a population corresponds to the density matrix ρ
X → ρ (69)
and from equations (31) and (48)
Λ→ Hˆ , (70)
8where H = i~Hˆ. Through these quantization relation-
ships the replicator dynamics takes the form of the equa-
tion of evolution of mixed states
i~
dρ(t)
dt
= [H(t), ρ(t)] (71)
and according with equation (49) the entropy of our sys-
tem would be given by
σ = −Tr(X lnX), (72)
where xij are the elements of the matrix X.
We can translate our classical definitions to the quan-
tum world like the payoff function
fi(ρ) =
n∑
j=1
aijρjj (73)
and the average fitness of the population
〈f(ρ)〉 =
n∑
k,l=1
aklρkkρll. (74)
When the non diagonal elements of A and ρ are zero
Q =
1
2
Aρ (75)
so that we can rewrite Λ as
Λ =
1
2
[Aρ− ρAρ] (76)
and due to the fact that H = i~Λ
H =
i~
2
[Aρ− ρAρ] (77)
the average energy of our system is
〈E〉 = Tr(ρH),
〈E〉 =
i~
2
Tr [ρAρ− ρAρ] = 0. (78)
For this case it is easy to note in equation (76) that the
Hamiltonian H of our system is a diagonal matrix in
where its elements Hii correspond to its eigenvalues and
its eigenvectors are
|Ψ1〉 = c11 |1〉+ c12 |0〉+ ...+ c1i |0〉+ ...+ c1n |0〉 ,
|Ψ2〉 = c21 |0〉+ c22 |1〉+ ...+ c2i |0〉+ ...+ c2n |0〉 ,
... (79)
|Ψn〉 = cn1 |0〉+ cn2 |0〉+ ...+ cni |0〉+ ...+ cnn |1〉
subject to the constrain
∑n
j=1 |cij |
2
= 1. For the case of
a two person symmetric game with aij = 0 and ρij = 0
the eigenvectors of the game are
|Ψ1〉 = α |1〉+ β |0〉 ,
|Ψ2〉 = γ |0〉+ δ |1〉 , (80)
where α, β, γ, δ are subject to the constrains |α|
2
+ |β|
2
=
1 and |γ|
2
+ |δ|
2
= 1. For this case also [Λ, ρ] = Λ and
dX
dt
= Λ. (81)
The payoff function takes the form f(x) = Aρ and its
trace is equal to
Tr(f(x)) = 〈A〉ρ (82)
and the average payoff function is given by
〈f(x)〉 = Tr(ρAρ). (83)
For xij = 0 our entropy takes the form
σ = −
n∑
i=1
xii lnxii = −
n∑
i=1
xi lnxi. (84)
Finally, the equation of evolution of mixed states from
quantum statistical mechanics (48) is the quantum ana-
logue of the replicator dynamics in matrix form (31)
and the respective matrixes of both systems have similar
properties.
VII. QUANTUM STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM
Quantum mechanics could be a much more general the-
ory that we had thought. It could encloses theories like
EGT and evolutionary dynamics and we could explain
through this theory biological and economical processes.
From this point of view many of the equations, concepts
and its properties defined quantically must be more gen-
eral that its classical versions which must remain inside
of the foundations of the new quantum version. So, our
quantum equilibrium concept also must be more general
than the one defined classically.
If in an isolated system each of its accessible states
do not have the same probability, the system is not in
equilibrium. The system will vary and will evolution in
the time until it reaches the equilibrium state when the
probability of finding the system in each of the accessible
states be the same. Then the system will find its more
probable configuration in which the number of accessible
states is maximum and equally probable. The whole sys-
tem will vary and rearrange its state and the states of its
ensembles with the purpose of maximize its entropy and
reach its minimum energy state. We could say that the
purpose and maximum payoff of a quantum system is its
minimum energy state.
The system and its members will vary and rearrange
themselves to reach the best possible state for each of
them which is also the best possible state for the whole
system. This can be seen like a microscopical cooperation
between quantum objects to improve its state with the
9purpose of reaching or maintaining the equilibrium of
the system. All the members of our quantum system will
play a game in which its maximum payoff is its minimum
energy state. Different particles will cooperate to form
a system in which its new state will have to be better
than the one they had before they interact by forming an
atom. Different atoms will cooperate to form a system
in which its new state have to be better than the one
they had before they formed what is called a “inorganic”
molecule.
A system is stable only if it maximizes the welfare of
the collective above the welfare of the individual, if it is
maximized the welfare of the individual above the welfare
of the collective the system gets unstable and eventually
it collapses.
Gafiychuk and Prykarpatsky [45] applied the replica-
tor equations written in the form of nonlinear von Neu-
mann equations to the study of the general properties of
the quasispecies dynamical system from the standpoint
of its evolution and stability. They developed a mathe-
matical model of a naturally fitted coevolving ecosystem
and a theoretical study a self-organization problem of an
ensemble of interacting species. DNA is a nonlinear dy-
namical system and its evolution is a sequence of chemical
reactions. An abstract DNA-type system is defined by a
set of nonlinear kinetic equations with polynomial non-
linearities that admit soliton solutions associated with
helical geometry. Aerts and Czachor [46] shown that the
set of these equations allows for two different Lax repre-
sentations: They can be written as von Neumann type
nonlinear systems and they can be regarded as a com-
patibility condition for a Darboux-covariant Lax pair.
Organisms whose DNA evolves in a chaotic way would
be eliminated by natural selection. They also explained
why non-Kolmogorovian probability models occurring in
soliton kinetics are naturally associated with chemical
reactions. Gogonea and Merz [38] indicated that games
are being played at the quantum mechanical level in pro-
tein folding. Turner and Chao [47] studied the evolu-
tion of competitive interactions among viruses in an RNA
phage, and found that the fitness of the phage generates
a payoff matrix conforming to the two-person prisoner’s
dilemma game. Bacterial infections by viruses have been
presented as classical game-like situations where nature
prefers the dominant strategies. Patel [39, 40] suggested
quantum dynamics played a role in the DNA replication
and the optimization criteria involved in genetic infor-
mation processing. He considers the criteria involved as
a task similar to an unsorted assembly operation where
the Grover’s database search algorithm fruitfully applies;
given the different optimal solutions for classical and
quantum dynamics. Azhar Iqbal [22] showed results in
which quantum mechanics has strong and important roles
in selection of stable solutions in a system of interacting
“entities”. These entities can do quantum actions on
quantum states. It may simply consists of a collection
of molecules and the stability of solutions or equilibria
can be affected by quantum interactions which provides
a new approach towards theories of rise of complexity in
groups of quantum interacting entities. Neuroeconomics
[48, 49] may provide an alternative to the classical Carte-
sian model of the brain and behavior [50] through a rich
dialogue between theoretical neurobiology and quantum
logic [51, 52].
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
It has been shown that through the quantization rela-
tionships proposed the quantum analogue of the replica-
tor dynamics is the equation of evolution of mixed states
of a quantum system. A population is represented by
a quantum system in which each subpopulation playing
strategy si is represented by a pure ensemble in state |Ψk〉
and with probability pk . The probability xi of playing
strategy si or the relative frequency of the individuals
using strategy si in that population will be represented
as the probability ρii of finding each pure ensemble in the
state |i〉 . Through quantum mechanics we can describe
economical and biological processes from a different per-
spective and with a quantum equilibrium concept which
is more general that whichever defined classically. The
purpose and maximum payoff of a system is improve its
state by maximizing the welfare of its members through
maximizing the welfare of the system. For a quantum
system the maximum payoff is its minimum energy state.
The system and all its members will cooperate and re-
arrange its states to improve its present condition. A
system is stable only if it maximizes the welfare of the
collective above the welfare of the individual or else the
system gets unstable and eventually it collapses.
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